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This paper attempts to identify the effect of fiscal decentralization on public sector efficiency 
(PSE). We employ data envelopment analysis on a panel of 21 OECD countries over the 
period 1970-2000 to construct two alternative PSE indicators that reflect the governmental 
goals of economic performance and stability. In turn, using a novel technique that merges the 
methodologies of Simar and Wilson (2007) and Khan and Lewbel (2007), we regress the PSE 
scores obtained on an extensive set of alternative fiscal decentralization measures. Backed by 
strong empirical results, obtained from a number of different specifications, we contend that 
PSE is increasing with fiscal decentralization. 
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1. Introduction 
It has long been recognized that governments differ significantly in the efficiency of 
delivering public services (see e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1998; Afonso et al., 2005). Some 
are extremely wasteful and ineffective in performing basic activities, whereas others achieve 
their objectives in a systematic and comprehensive way. The strive to increase government/ 
public sector efficiency (PSE hereafter) has spawned a vigorous theoretical literature on 
channels that may affect it, with a quite prominent one being the design of fiscal relation 
across the levels of government. A strand of the ongoing debate argues that fiscal 
decentralization is positively associated with government efficiency and attributes this effect 
either to increased electoral control – that comes as a result of increased decentralization (see 
e.g. Seabright, 1996) – or to yardstick competition among local governments (see e.g. Besley 
and Case, 1995;  Besley and Smart, 2007).
1 In contrast, other scholars note that local 
politicians and bureaucrats are likely to face increased pressure from local interest groups 
(see e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000) and argue that fiscal decentralization, under these 
or similar state of affairs, undermines government efficiency (Prud’homme, 1995).
2 
In the recent years, there is a small, albeit growing, body of empirical work that aims at 
identifying the effect of fiscal decentralization on the quality of government (see e.g. Fisman 
and Gatti, 2002a;  Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007). In most of these studies, the 
dependent variable is some internationally comparable outcome of government policy –   
usually captured by socioeconomic indices like infant mortality, the literacy ratio, 
immunization of population etc. – and the key explanatory variable is fiscal decentralization, 
measured as the ratio of sub-national government expenditures (resp. tax revenues) to total 
public spending  (resp. tax revenues).
3 Yet, the theoretical hypotheses postulated above are 
                                                 
1 Another branch of the literature argues that fiscal decentralization restricts the governments’ Leviathan 
behavior and the consequent overspending by the politicians, through inter-jurisdictional fiscal competition (see 
e.g. Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Edwards and Keen, 1996). 
2 This argument goes back to Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison who argued that the lower the 
level of government, the greater is the extent of vulnerability to vested interest and the less protected the 
minorities and poor tend to be [The Federalist Papers, 1787]. 
3 Fisman and Gatti (2002a) and Mello and Barenstein (2001) find that increased decentralization (measured as 
the budgetary share of subnational governments) is associated with lower levels of corruption. In a similar vein, 
Fisman and Gatti (2002b) and Henderson and Kuncoro (2004) using sub-national data for the US and Indonesia, 
respectively, show that decentralization of public expenditure is effective in reducing corruption only if it is 
accompanied by increased power to raise revenue (i.e. increased tax autonomy). Robalino et al. (2001) and 
Khalegian (2003) in cross-country studies, also find support that fiscal decentralization is associated with lower 
infant mortality rates and immunization rates (taken as measures of the quality of governance). Finally, 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) examine the effect of decentralization on a set of four indicators of 
governance quality (namely the three indicators used in studies reviewed above plus the illiteracy ratio) and 
conclude that the effects of fiscal decentralization are beneficial only in countries that are also characterized by 
a high degree of political centralization.    3
not comprehensively addressed simply by employing socioeconomic indicators as measures 
of “good governance”. This is because these measures do not encompass the size of 
government spending and thus fail to reflect the level of efficiency in delivering government 
services. In the words of Barankay and Lockwood (2007) “[…] these regressions do not 
estimate government “production functions” because they do not control for the inputs to the 
output that is the dependent variable. […] In the absence of controls for these inputs, these 
regressions cannot tell us much about the efficiency of government as any observed 
correlation between decentralization and government output can be due to omitted variable 
bias.”   
In an effort to construct a plausible connection between theory and identification, the 
purpose of this paper is to generate an empirical model that analyzes the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and PSE. Therefore, we opt for direct measures of PSE, derived non-
parametrically at a first stage of analysis.  In particular, we use data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) on a panel of 21 OECD countries that covers the period 1970-2000 to construct two 
alternative PSE indicators that reflect the goals of economic performance and stability. By 
doing this, we implicitly assume that these indicators are derived from an underlying 
government production relationship, where public spending serves as the input in the 
production of public services.
4 In the subsequent stage of analysis, we regress the PSE scores 
obtained on a set of alternative fiscal decentralization measures following a technique that 
merges the methodologies of Simar and Wilson (2007) and Khan and Lewbel (2007).
5 Given 
this methodological novelty, the main contribution of our study is that our dependent variable 
allows for differences in the size of government spending and, therefore, does not give an 
unfair credit to wasteful governments, even when the latter achieve better outcomes.  
Our main finding is that government efficiency increases with the degree of fiscal 
decentralization. This result appears to be robust to a number of different specifications and 
fiscal decentralization measures. More precisely, we employ alternatively fiscal 
decentralization measures as developed by Stegarescu (2005b), the measures reported in the 
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (2002), and measures of fiscal autonomy (reflecting 
vertical fiscal imbalance and taxation autonomy) and we show that the positive relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and PSE survives in all different specifications.  
                                                 
4 This is as in Tanzi and Schuknecht (1998) and Afonso et al. (2005). 
5 We have resorted to this technique mainly because the second-stage analysis may not be robustly carried out 
with conventional econometric methods. For details see Section 4.   4
The structure of the rest of the paper emerges along the following lines. Section 2 
presents the theoretical considerations. In Section 3 we describe the data used in our 
empirical analysis, as well as the DEA technique employed to obtain the government 
efficiency estimates. In Section 4 we illustrate the econometric methodology used to regress 
the government efficiency estimates on fiscal decentralization measures. In Section 5 we 
present and discuss the empirical results and, finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical considerations 
The theoretical literature on fiscal federalism identifies two benchmark channels through 
which fiscal decentralization is expected to affect positively the efficiency of governments. 
These are (i) increased electoral control and (ii) yardstick competition among local 
governments that comes as a result of decentralization.
6 On the other hand, it has been also 
pointed out that fiscal decentralization may be negatively associated with government 
efficiency. In the presence of economies of scale (see e.g. Stein, 1997) or differences in the 
quality of human capital between national and sub-national bureaucracies (Prud’homme, 
1995), decentralization may lead to higher costs and thus increased inefficiency in the 
delivery of public services. In the present section, we briefly review these mechanisms and 
we set out the main testable hypotheses of our paper. 
According to the electoral control mechanism, decentralization reduces the incentives for 
officials to divert rents and increases the probability of “bad” incumbents to be voted out of 
office, therefore affecting the overall efficiency of the government positively (Hindriks and 
Lockwood, 2005). More precisely, Seabright (1996) shows that rent-seeking politicians, 
when contesting in decentralized elections, face incentives to please the voters in each (local) 
constituency, whereas in national elections they should please the voters only in a majority of 
localities to get re-elected. Similar results are obtained by Persson and Tabellini (2000), 
Hindriks and Lockwood (2005) and Myerson (2006). 
The second path through which fiscal decentralization can alter the incentives and the 
selection effects of elections is via yardstick competition. According to this theory (see e.g. 
Shleifer, 1985; Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995), citizens have an advantage in 
evaluating the performance of their policy makers when they are able to compare the policy 
                                                 
6 Barankay and Lockwood (2007) suggest an additional mechanism through which fiscal decentralization may 
lead to increased efficiency, namely the decrease in lobbying by interest groups. However, since the theoretical 
literature (see e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Bordignon et al., 2003; Redoano, 2003) appears to be rather 
inconclusive on this issue (mainly because under certain conditions there may be more lobbying with 
decentralization), we prefer not to include this mechanism in the ones we refer to as benchmark.   5
choices of their own political representatives with the corresponding choices of neighbor 
regions’ policy makers.
7 Therefore, fiscal decentralization may raise PSE, since it provides 
citizens the chance to compare public services and taxes across jurisdictions and helps them 
to judge whether their government wastes resources through low human capital capacity or 
rent-seeking (Besley and Smart, 2007).  
However, fiscal decentralization may also exert a negative impact on the efficiency of 
government. This impact may be attributed to a number of potential advantages of the 
provision of public goods by central governments. First, in the presence of economies of 
scale, decentralization may lead to higher costs (see e.g. Stein, 1997). Second, national 
government bureaucracies are more likely to offer talented people better careers and 
possibilities of promotion, which may in turn attract higher quality individuals (Prud’homme, 
1995). Finally, other scholars underline the potential danger that local politicians and 
bureaucrats are likely to face increased pressure from local interest groups (see e.g. Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 2000; Prud’homme, 1995). In view of these contradictory theoretical 
underpinnings, we provide below an empirical framework to analyze the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and PSE. 
 
3. The data 
3.1. Public sector efficiency estimates using DEA 
The measurement of PSE and the resulting comparison of individual countries in terms of 
the efficient functioning of their public sectors, present a number of difficulties related to the 
scarcity of publicly available data and the complicated problems that may emerge in the 
estimation procedure. In the present study, we opt for a direct estimation of productive PSE 
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
8 
DEA is a non-parametric programming technique that provides a linear piecewise 
frontier, by enveloping the observed data points, and yields a convex production possibilities 
set.
9 As such, it does not require the explicit specification of a functional form of the 
                                                 
7 The theory of yardstick competition is also studied by Bordignon et al. (2004), Belleflamme and Hindriks 
(2003), Besley and Smart (2007) and Bodenstein and Ursprung (2001). 
8 Only recently a number of studies cultivated an effort towards the computation of PSE indicators. Concerning 
OECD economies, Afonso et al. (2005) employed a nonparametric method to estimate relative efficiency scores 
for several parts of the public sector during the 1980s and the 1990s, while Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005) 
focused on the efficiency of government spending on education and health. Using similar techniques, Gupta and 
Verhoeven (2001), Sijpe and Rayp (2007) and Afonso et al. (2006) focused on developing countries. Finally, 
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) considered using DEA to analyze the efficiency of local governments in Spain.  
9 For an excellent account on DEA, see Coelli et al. (2005).   6
underlying production relationship. To introduce some notation, let us assume that for N 
observations there exist M inputs in the production of public goods, yielding S outputs. 
Hence, each observation n uses a nonnegative vector of inputs denoted 
12 ( , ,..., )
nn nn M
m x xx x R + =∈  to produce a nonnegative vector of outputs, denoted 
12 ( , ,..., )
nn nnS
S yy yyR + =∈ . Production technology,  {( , ):  can produce y} Fy x x = , describes 
the set of feasible input-output vectors, and the input sets of production technology, 
() {: (,) } Ly x yx F =∈  describe the sets of input vectors that are feasible for each output 
vector (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  
To measure productive efficiency we use the following input-oriented DEA model,
10 
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where public sector 0 represents one of the N public sectors under evaluation, and xi0 and yr0 
are the ith input and rth output for public sector 0, respectively. If θ
* = 1, then the current 
input levels cannot be proportionally reduced, indicating that public sector 0 is on the 
frontier. Otherwise, if θ
* < 1, then public sector 0 is inefficient and θ
* represents its input-
oriented efficiency score. Finally, λ is the activity vector denoting the intensity levels at 
which the N observations are conducted. Note that this approach, through the convexity 
constraint  1 λ Σ= (which accounts for variable returns to scale) forms a convex hull of 
intersecting planes, since the frontier production plane is defined by combining some actual 
production planes.  
                                                 
10 DEA may be computed either as input or output oriented. Input-oriented DEA shows by how much input 
quantities can be reduced without varying the output quantities produced. Output-oriented DEA assesses by 
how much output quantities can be proportionally increased without changing the input quantities used. The two 
measures provide the same results under constant returns to scale but give slightly different values under 
variable returns to scale. Nevertheless, both output and input oriented models will identify the same set of 
efficient/inefficient public sectors (see Coelli et al., 2005). Also, a constant returns to scale assumption is only 
appropriate when all public sectors are operating in an optimal scale (imperfections, asymmetries, etc. are not 
present), and therefore we opt for a variable returns to scale specification.   7
Obviously, to measure PSE some “performance measures” are required that could be 
interpreted as outputs of total public spending (which naturally serves as the input of the 
production of public services) and should reflect the objectives (or alternatively the tasks) of 
government. Following the rationale of the relevant literature (see e.g. Afonso et al., 2005; 
Angelopoulos and Philippopoulos, 2005), we utilize two well-established performance 
indicators that reflect benchmark tasks of government. These are: (i) the economic 
performance indicator (EcPerf) and (ii) the economic stability indicator (EcStab).
11 
The  EcPerf measure assumes that the government output is composed by the 
unemployment rate, GDP per capita and the annual GDP growth rate. More precisely, lower 
scores in the unemployment rate and higher scores in GDP per capita and GDP growth 
reflect better economic performance. Data for the unemployment rate are taken from 
OECD’s Economic Outlook (2005), whereas data for GDP per capita and GDP growth are 
obtained from World Bank’s Development Indicators (2004). On the other hand, the EcStab 
indicator consists of the standard deviation of the GDP growth rate, which is interpreted as a 
measure of economic fluctuations, and of the inflation rate. In this case, lower scores in both 
measures reflect higher economic stability.  Data for standard deviation of the GDP growth 
rate are taken from OECD Economic Outlook: Annual and Quarterly Data (2007)
12 and data 
for the inflation rate are obtained from World Bank’s Development Indicators (2004). 
Finally, data for total public spending (the input) are also obtained from the World Bank’s 
Development Indicators (2004). Our dataset consists of 21 OECD countries and spans the 
period 1970-2000.
13 
Space constraints prevent reporting the yearly results of estimation of Program 1 and, 
therefore, we present 10-year averages for each country on the Figures in Appendix B.
14 The 
first set of four graphs presents the relative efficiency scores when the government target is 
economic performance and the second set the equivalent when the government target is 
economic stability. Scores where data for any of the input or output of the production process 
are missing are not derived for the particular country. Sensitivity analyses performed on 
                                                 
11 As Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000, pp. 75) state: “It is difficult or even impossible to consider all the social and 
economic objectives (and thus all the socioeconomic indicators) that the governments might want to influence 
with this spending. By necessity, the analysis will include fewer indicators than might have been desirable to 
include”. 
12 Annual data on standard deviation of the growth rate is obtained by utilizing the quarterly data available in 
the Economic Outlook. 
13 The countries in our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK 
and USA. 
14 The full set of Stage 1 results is available upon request.   8
Program 1 showed that efficient public sectors remained efficient to any simultaneous data 
changes in the respective inputs (for a detailed discussion of the sensitivity analysis on DEA 
estimates see Zhu, 2003).  
When the government goal is economic performance, the PSE frontier is mainly shaped 
by Japan (if data is available) and Switzerland, with USA, Luxembourg, Canada and, most 
importantly, Ireland gaining significant ground towards the end of the period. Besides these 
countries, and although the ranking of public sectors appears to change through time, we note 
that Australia and Norway are characterized by relatively efficient public sectors, whereas 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Ireland (in the beginning of the sample period) are the 
poor performers. The results are strikingly similar when the government goal is assumed to 
be economic stability. The frontier is shaped by exactly the same countries and the patterns 
of change remain unaltered, with Ireland, Canada and USA substantially improving their PSE 
scores by the end of the sample period. A noticeable development is that most countries tend 
to achieve higher PSE scores towards the end of the period examined, even if they are among 
the relatively poor performers. Overall, these results seem to be reasonable approximations of 
prior academic belief and are aligned with findings of previous research (see e.g. Afonso et 
al., 2005). 
 
3.2. Fiscal decentralization measures 
The best approximation of the degree of fiscal decentralization has been an issue of 
considerable disagreement among empirical studies. Usually, it is proxied by the budgetary 
share of sub-national units as recorded by the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics 
(GFS).
15 However, this widely employed measure bears major shortcomings, since it fails to 
integrate vital aspects of intergovernmental relations. Most importantly, it fails to capture the 
real degree of sub-national governments’ autonomy that is to reflect the extent to which 
decisions regarding revenues and expenditures are truly assigned to lower levels of 
government (see Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003; Stegarescu, 2005b; Barankay and Lockwood, 
2007). In particular, it has been pointed out that the GFS measure tends to overestimate the 
share of government expenditure and tax revenues that is controlled by sub-national 
governments and that it does so in a way that varies widely across countries (Ebel and 
Yilmaz, 2003). For example, consider the extreme case of a country where all taxes are set 
nationally, but where the revenues are shared with local governments via a fixed formula. 
                                                 
15 Previous empirical studies based on the GFS measure of fiscal decentralization are Jin and Zou (2002), 
Davoodi and Zou (1998), Fisman and Gatti (2002a) and Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya (2007).   9
The share of tax revenues going to sub-national governments is measured in the GFS 
statistics as sub-national revenue, even though local governments have no control over the 
tax rate and the tax base. Similar problems arise on the expenditure side from policies that 
are controlled by central government, but implemented by sub-national governments 
(Stegarescu, 2005b; Barankay and Lockwood, 2007).
16 
In view of these difficulties, Stegarescu (2005b) developed new measures of fiscal 
decentralization and sub-national tax autonomy, based on the detailed data provided by 
OECD (1999). The advantage of the OECD (1999) survey is that it classifies in a very 
analytical way the taxes of sub-national governments according to the degree of decision-
making autonomy.
17 More precisely, it separates taxes that are set by sub-central 
governments (i.e. sub-central governments determine the tax rate and the corresponding tax 
base) from those that are determined by the central government at a national level and in turn 
shared with sub-national units. To this end, Stegarescu’s measures of fiscal decentralization 
reflect the “real” tax-raising autonomy of sub-national units, since they count as local tax 
revenues only those strictly determined by sub-national governments.
18  
In this study, we employ both the decentralization measures developed by Stegarescu 
(2005b) and the decentralization indicators of the public finance statistics reported in the 
GFS database. More precisely, we employ (i) the tax revenue decentralization indicator, 
(TaxRevDec) and (ii) the revenue decentralization indicator as constructed by Stegarescu 
(RevDec);
19 (iii) the GFS expenditure decentralization measure (DecGFS1) and (iv) the GFS 
revenue decentralization measure (DecGFS2).
20 
Finally, following the paradigm of Jin and Zou (2002), we also use measures of revenue 
and expenditure autonomy of the local governments. These measures are: (i) TaxAut, defined 
as sub-central government own tax revenue as a share of sub-central government total tax 
revenue (obtained from Stegarescu, 2005b); (ii) TaxAutGFS, defined as sub-national tax 
revenue as a share of sub-national revenue and grants (taken from GFS, 2002); (iii) 
VertImb1, defined as transfers from other levels of government as a share of sub-national 
                                                 
16 Stegarescu (2005b) finds that the GFS measure of tax revenue decentralization overestimates the extent of 
fiscal decentralization. This is particularly the case for Austria (28.4% versus 3.5%), Belgium (44.4% versus 
24.6%) and Germany (49.4% versus 7.3).The percentages refer to data from 1999 and 2000. 
17 See Appendix A for details.  
18 To our knowledge, empirical application of these measures is limited to Fiva (2006), Stegarescu (2005a) and 
Lessmann (2006). 
19 The RevDec indicator represents the vertical structure of all the sources of public revenue. Thus, compared 
with the TaxRevDec index, it additionally accounts for the structure of non-tax revenue (e.g. user charges or 
operational surplus of public enterprises). 
20 See Appendix A for details and definitions and Appendix C for correlations between these measures.   10
expenditures; and (iv) VertImb2, defined as transfers from other levels of government as a 
share of sub-national revenues and grants.
21 The latter two indices (both taken from the GFS 
database) are measures of vertical fiscal imbalance and are expected to affect PSE negatively. 
This is because voters view intergovernmental grants and “own resources” through different 
lenses and they are more likely to sanction overspending by politicians when local 
governments are purely financed by intergovernmental grants (see e.g. Oates 1979, 1991).
22 
In contrast, TaxAut and TaxAutGFS are expected to affect PSE positively, as higher values 
for both variables indicate higher degree of tax autonomy.     
 
3.3. Other controls 
To ensure correct econometric identification, we use a series of additional controls. First, 
we employ a standard demographic variable, namely the dependency ratio of the population 
(i.e. the share of population aged below 16 and above 65 to total population), denoted as 
depend. Depend is expected to exert a negative impact on PSE. This is because a higher 
proportion of economically dependent population generates fiscal needs for programs 
targeted towards the dependant group. Note that these programs are mainly transfers that do 
not directly affect (what is assumed here to be) government output, while at the same time 
they increase total government spending.
23 Data for depend  are obtained from the WDI 
(2004). 
In order to control for the overall level of productivity in the economy, we employ a total 
factor productivity growth index (denoted as TFP), which is estimated as the residual of the 
regression of the growth rate of per capita capital on the growth rate of per capita output, for 
each country in our sample (see Solow, 1957; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Countries that 
present higher productivity growth are expected to be characterized by higher productivity in 
their public sectors as well. Note, that the causality between TFP and PSE may be reverse 
(i.e. higher PSE may lead to increased overall productivity). Therefore, in the empirical 
specification, we assume that these variables are endogenous.   
                                                 
21 See Appendix A for details and definitions and Appendix C for correlations between these measures. 
22  As it is usually suggested, intergovernmental grants create the picture that local public spending is funded by 
non-residents. This is because local voters within a central legislature receive benefits from grants without 
internalizing their full cost (Weingast el al 1988, Rattsø 2000). 
23 This effect holds only for the measures of government output we employ here. Certainly, as transfer programs 
are expected to create additional effects in the economy (e.g. changes in inequality) they also affect other 
government activities and, therefore, may represent forms of government output. Had we measured the 
efficiency of government in providing such outputs, the relationship between Depend and government 
efficiency may have been different from the one suggested in the text.       11
Moreover, we employ two measures of the constraints that the government faces, (i) a 
simple openness indicator (i.e. total trade over GDP) corrected for country size
24 (Open) and 
(ii) an index of government regulation (EconFreedom) as measured by Gwartney and 
Lawson (2004), in which higher values reflect less interventionist governments. For three 
main reasons we expect both variables to be positively associated with PSE. First, more trade 
and domestic restrictions create rents and therefore higher waste through rent seeking 
activities (Krueger, 1974; Gatti, 1999). Second, lower international openness and greater 
government intervention imply lower product market competition within the country, which 
is also associated with increased government waste (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). Finally, 
within an international setting, the domestic government must be more efficient if it seeks to 
attract foreign investors (Wei, 2000).  
To measure the propensity of the state to employ redistributive policies, we use a 
measure of population heterogeneity. According to Alesina et al. (2003), La Porta et al. 
(1999) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), countries with high ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization are expected to exhibit inferior government performance. Once again many 
reasons have been put forward to justify this relationship. First, high ethnic fractionalization 
results into pressures for redistribution between groups (Easterly and Levine, 1997). 
Moreover, it may lead to high demand for publicly provided private goods, especially those 
that can be targeted towards specific groups (Alesina et. al., 2003). It is also possible that a 
relationship between fractionalization and corruption is formed. Finally, in more extreme 
circumstances, increased ethnic fractionalization may lead to ethnic hatred and ultimately to 
violent civil wars that disrupt the workings of government (see Fearon, 2003). Following 
Easterly and Levine (1997), we control for ethno-linguistic fractionalization using a 
Herfindahl index (named Ethnolig), which is calculated on the basis of the share of each 
                                                 
24 There are several reasons why the uncorrected for size measure of openness does not correctly reflect the 
constraints that the economy faces from the international environment. The first is a simple statistical bias: 
when a large and a small country trade with each other, the volume of trade is the same for both, but trade 
shares as a portion of GDP differ. Second, in the presence of increasing returns to scale in production, the 
market size affects the overall level of productivity. This argument goes back to Adam Smith who argued that 
the size of the market imposes a constraint on the division of labor. Therefore, small countries that are relatively 
closed to international trade must experience a lower level of productivity. Ades and Glaeser (1999), Wacziarg 
(2001) and Alesina et al. (2000) provide empirical evidence consistent with these ideas: large countries 
experience smaller dynamic gains from trade. Finally, according to Frankel and Romer (1999, p.382), “smaller 
countries may engage in more trade with other countries simply because they engage in less within-country 
trade”. For further details on the relationship between openness and country size see also Alesina and Spolaore 
(2003, chapter 6) and Alesina and Wacziarg (1998, pp.306-307). To correct for this bias we run a regression 
with total trade over GDP as the dependent variable and the share of country i's GDP to the average GDP of our 
sample (at the same time period) as the independent variable. Then, we use the residuals from this regression as 
an indicator for openness (see Bretschger and Hettich, 2002).   12
separate ethno-linguistic group over total population (data are obtained from La Porta et al., 
1999). 
The final set of controls we employ includes variables that refer to the structure of the 
elected government. Therefore, we use the variable NSM, taken from Mierau et al. (2007), 
which reports the number of ministers that directly use part of the government budget (i.e. 
the total number of ministers excluding the minister of finance). Since we expect that these 
ministers care about the size of the budget they control,
25 the relationship between NSM and 
PSE should be negative.
26 Finally, the variable coalition, taken from Tavares (2004), is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if a coalition cabinet that includes ministers from two or 
more parties is in power. As the number of parties involved in the government increases, the 
accountability of each of the parties usually diminishes, thus providing fewer incentives for 
efficiency. In addition, coalition governments are typically associated with a shorter life span 
(see Schofield, 1993; Müller and Strøm, 2000) and therefore are less concerned with superior 
performance.     
 
4.  Empirical methodology 
Based on the theoretical considerations of the previous section, we estimate the following 
empirical model: 
0 it k it it p zu α β =+ +            ( 2 )    
where  it p  are government efficiency estimates derived from Program (1) and  it z  are the set 
of explanatory variables described above. 
Unfortunately, it turns out that estimation of Eq. (2) is not a trivial econometric issue. In 
particular, when non-parametrically derived measures (like the DEA efficiency scores) are 
regressed against a number of determinants, conventional censored regressions (such as Tobit 
regressions) yield biased results.
27 Only very recently Simar and Wilson (2007) proposed a 
robust procedure to overcome the associated difficulties. Specifically, they offer an 
algorithm, comprised of subsequent steps, that begins with a truncated regression and ends 
with the estimation of confidence intervals. Still, as discussed above, the total factor 
productivity variable may be endogenous in the PSE measures. To account for this 
                                                 
25 Ministers care about the size of the budget they receive for many reasons, which may include participation in 
rent-seeking activities, increase in the size of the bureau they control (Niskanen, 1973) and the ability to make 
income transfers as a means for controlling a larger political clientele.     
26 This effect is consistent with the idea that there may exist diseconomies of scale in the administration of 
government (see Stein, 1997).  
27 This is mainly due (but not limited) to the fact that DEA efficiency estimates are serially correlated (for a 
proof and further details, see Simar and Wilson, 2007).   13
endogeneity we follow the methodology put forth by Khan and Lewbel (2007), who for the 
first time suggested a truncated regression model with endogenous regressors.
28 To this end, 
we merge the algorithm suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) with the two-stage least 
squares truncated regression model put forth by Khan and Lewbel (2007). We consider all 
observations as cross sections and therefore we drop subscript t in Eq. (2). Consequently, the 
following procedure may be used to provide inference on the determinants of PSE: 
1.  Obtain maximum likelihood estimates  ˆk α  of  k α  and  u σ )  of  u σ  in the endogenous 
truncated regression of  ˆi p  on its k determinants (zi) in Eq. (2), where  ˆi p ≤1. The 
instrument used is the one period lag of the endogenous variables (i.e. lagged one period 
TFP).
29  
2.  Loop over the next three steps L=2000 times to obtain a  set of bootstrap 
estimates
**
1 ˆ ˆ (,)
L
iu b b ασ
=  Β=   
  For each i=1,…,m, draw ui from the 
2 ˆ (0, ) u N σ distribution with left-truncation at  ˆ (1 ) i za − . 
For details on how to draw from a left-truncated normal distribution see the Appendix of 
Simar and Wilson (2007). 
  Again for each i=1,…,m, compute 
* ˆ ii i p zu α = + . 
  Use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the endogenous truncated regression of 
*
i p  on  i z , yielding estimates 
** , µ ν µ ν . 
3.  Use the bootstrap values in B and the original estimatesα ,  u σ  to construct estimated 
confidence intervals for each element of α  and for  u σ . This is done by using the jth 
element of each bootstrap value 
* ˆ α  to find values 
** , π π µ ν  such that 
** ˆˆ Pr ( ) 1 jj ππ ν αα µ π  −≤ − ≤ ≈ −  , for some small conventional value of π ,  0.05 π =  in 
the present analysis. The approximation improves as L →∞. Substituting 
** , π π µ ν  for 
, π π µ ν  in  ˆ Pr ( ) 1 jj ππ ν αα µ π  −≤ − ≤ = −   leads to an estimated confidence interval 
** ˆˆ (,) jj π π α µα ν ++ .  
 
 
                                                 
28 Their simulation results show that their new estimator performs well, while they specifically state that their 
method is applicable in general contexts involving two-stage analyses with a nonparametric first stage, such as 
ours. 
29 The results of the paper remain intact if more lags as instrumental variables.    14
5. Results 
In this section we discuss the results obtained by estimating Eq. (2), using the data 
described in Section 3 and the empirical methodology presented in the previous section. The 
baseline results are presented in Tables 1 and 2, while the extensive sensitivity analyses 
performed are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
30  
 
5.1. Basic results 
Table 1 reports the results of the regressions of PSE on alternative measures of fiscal 
decentralization. In column 1, the government efficiency estimates are regressed on 
TaxRevDec, as well as on our set of control variables (i.e. Coalition, NSM, EconFreedom, 
Depend, TFP, Open, Ethnolig). In all estimated equations, we include regional dummies (see 
Appendix A) and a time trend. Evidently, the coefficient on TaxRevDec bears a positive sign 
and is significant at the 1% level, suggesting a strong positive link between fiscal 
decentralization and PSE. This result is aligned with the propositions of the theoretical debate 
discussed in Section 2. Focusing on the rest of the explanatory variables, we observe that 
coefficients on both Coalition and NSM present negative signs and are significant at 
conventional levels, indicating that coalition governments and large cabinets exert a negative 
impact on PSE. In contrast, EconFreedom is positive and highly significant, whereas the 
coefficient on Open is positive and marginally significant. These results may be explained by 
the beneficial effects of internal and external market constraints on the function of 
governments. Finally, Depend and Ethnolig appear to be insignificant determinants of PSE. 
In column 2, we re-estimate the model by using Revdec, instead of TaxRevDec, as a 
proxy for fiscal decentralization. As we have already pointed out, the Revdec indicator is a 
more general measure of fiscal decentralization, since it accounts for the vertical structure of 
non-tax revenues (such as user charges and operational surpluses of public enterprises), 
which is not encompassed in TaxRevDec.
31 Markedly, the main result of this second 
specification remains unaffected. The coefficient on Revdec is positive and highly 
significant, thus confirming the positive effect of fiscal decentralization on government 
efficiency. As regards the rest of the explanatory variables, we observe that only slight 
changes in the results emerge (compared to those presented in column 1). Specifically, the 
coefficients on Coalition and TFP  appear to lose their statistical significance, whereas 
                                                 
30 Note that in all estimated equations presented in the first two tables, we include regional dummies (see 
Appendix A), which are not reported to save space. The full set of results is available upon request. 
31 For details on this see Appendix A.   15
Ethnolig enters with a positive and significant coefficient. It should be noted that this result is 
not in line with our theoretical priors, since it implies that the relationship between ethno-
linguistic fractionalization and PSE is positive.  
In column 3 we employ as a proxy for fiscal decentralization the GFS expenditure 
decentralization measure (DecGFS1), which is also found to be positively and significantly 
related to government efficiency. As a final test, in column 4 we use DecGFS2, reaching 
similar conclusions. In these last two specifications, the behavior of the control variables is 
much similar to that observed in column 2. 
Table 2 presents the results of the regressions of PSE on the two alternative measures of 
tax autonomy and the two alternative measures of vertical fiscal imbalance. In column 1, the 
DEA government efficiency estimates are regressed on the Stegarescu (2005b) tax autonomy 
measure (denoted as TaxAut), as well as on the rest of the explanatory variables. The results 
suggest that TaxAut bears a positive sign and appears to be highly significant, which is 
consistent with our theoretical priors outlined in Section 2. Indeed, increased tax autonomy 
(or alternatively decreased dependency of local governments on intergovernmental transfers) 
explains, at least in OECD economies, higher levels of PSE. As suggested above, this 
relationship is probably associated with the adverse effect of tax autonomy due to the 
“common pool” problem. Turning to the rest of the explanatory variables, we observe that 
our results are similar to those presented in Table 1. More precisely, the coefficients on 
Coalition and NSM are negative and significant, whereas the coefficients on EconFreedom, 
TFP and Open are positive and significant. Finally, Depend and Ethnolig appear to be 
insignificant at conventional levels of statistical significance. 
In column 2 we employ the GFS tax autonomy measure (denoted as TaxAutGFS) instead 
of the TaxAut and we re-estimate Eq. (2). As expected, TaxAutGFS enters with a positive 
sign and is significant at the 1% level, validating the positive relationship between tax 
autonomy and PSE. Concerning the rest of the variables, our results remain practically 
unaffected, with the exception of Coalition (which loses its significance) and Ethnolig 
(which presents a positive and significant effect on PSE).  
In column 3, we employ a vertical fiscal imbalance measure (denoted as VertImb1) in 
order to capture the fiscal dependency of local governments on intergovernmental transfers. 
We observe that the coefficient on VertImb1 bears a negative sign and is significant at the 1% 
level. This result is in accordance with our previous findings on the relationship between tax 
autonomy and PSE, as well as the dominant view of the theoretical literature (see e.g. Oates 
1979, 1991). A similar result is reached by using an alternative fiscal dependency measure,   16
(i.e. VertImb2 in column 4). In both estimations presented in columns 3 and 4, the behavior 
of the control variables is similar to that observed in column 2.  
 
5.2. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we inquire into the robustness of our results. First, we examine the 
sensitivity of our estimates with respect to individual outliers, as well as with respect to 
regional characteristics. Next, we re-estimate our model using five year averages, in order to 
ensure that our results are not driven by the noise generated by annual data. Finally, we re-
estimate our benchmark model using an alternative measure of government efficiency, 
namely the economic stability (EcStab) indicator, as defined above.
32 
Seeing that our sample consists of 21 OECD countries, which are quite heterogeneous in 
many aspects, we first examine the sensitivity of our estimates to individual outliers or to 
regional characteristics. To account for the first issue, we re-estimate our benchmark model, 
this time excluding all observations with an error term in the upper or lower 5
th percentile 
(i.e. we drop 10% of our sample). The results, presented in column 1 and 2 of Table 3, 
indicate that the conclusions presented in Sections 5.1 are firm as regards the influence of 
individual outliers. The second issue that relates to the potential effect of regional 
characteristics has been (partially) addressed by including the three dummies Scandinavian, 
Anglo-Saxon, Mediterranean in the empirical models. Here we further examine whether the 
results change when we exclude each of these groups in turn. The results, presented in 
columns 5 to 10, suggest that the effects of Taxrevdec and TaxAut on PSE remain positive 
and significant at conventional levels. 
Another potential drawback of the analysis of the previous section is the annual nature of 
the dataset. This was the preferred choice with the aim of increasing the size of our sample, 
which may however come at the expense of also increasing the noise in the data.
33 This 
would imply that observed changes in PSE may be due to random factors (such as the 
business cycle), which are not necessarily related to changes in the explanatory variables. For 
this reason, we re-examine our two propositions using simple five-year averages of our data. 
The results, reported in column 3 and 4 of Table 3, suggest that even though for most of the 
control variables the statistical and economic significance drops, the variables of main 
                                                 
32 For expositional brevity, in Table 3 we present the results from using only Taxrevdec as the measure of 
decentralization. We have verified, however, that our results carry through to the rest of the measures used in 
Table2 1 and 2.   
33 Rodden (2003) underlines the importance of panel studies in examining fiscal decentralization and argues that 
cross-national studies fail to capture important aspects of this issue, since they do not account for the fact that 
the process of decentralization unfolds overtime.   17
interest remain practically unaffected. We attribute the increase in the standard errors to the 
fact that our sample is now confined to about 100 observations and it is well-known that 
maximum likelihood estimators usually produce a bias in small samples, with this bias 
diminishing as the sample increases. Nonetheless, as the coefficients on TaxRevDec  and 
TaxAut remain significant, we are confident that the positive relationship in hand is robust to 
the larger time span of our observations. 
An important sensitivity analysis involves estimation of Eq. (2) using a different 
dependent variable (namely EcStab) that looks into economic stability as the ultimate goal of 
governments.
34 Once again, we use a number of alternative specifications that capture the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and PSE and between fiscal dependency and 
PSE. The results, reported in Table 4, suggest no discrepancy from previous findings: 
Increased fiscal decentralization and tax autonomy exert a positive impact on PSE, with the 
results in some cases being enhanced compared to their counterparts of Tables 1 and 2.
35  




In this paper we specified an empirical framework to investigate the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on public sector efficiency. With this aim we (i) directly measured PSE 
using DEA, thereby specifying an underlying production process of public goods; and (ii) 
examined the impact of the variables of interest on PSE via the amalgamation of two 
prominent semi-parametric techniques. Therefore, we proceeded in two stages. The first 
involved estimation of PSE, in terms of assuming governments to aim for either economic 
performance or stability, while the second entailed regressing the PSE scores derived in stage 
1 on a number of well-established indicators for fiscal decentralization. The analysis was 
carried out on a panel that included 21 OECD economies over the period 1970-2000. Backed 
by strong empirical results, obtained from a number of different specifications and sensitivity 
analyses, we contend that public sector efficiency is increasing with fiscal decentralization. 
This relationship calls for a deeper understanding of the inter- and intra-country mechanisms 
that shape it; however, before moving on to another issue, we have better bring this entry to a 
close. 
                                                 
34 Note that until now we assumed that governments aim at improved economic performance.  
35 The vertical fiscal imbalance indicators enter the estimated equations (columns 5 and 6) with negative and 
significant coefficients, much like in Table 2.   18
 
 
Table 1  
Public sector efficiency and fiscal decentralization 
PSE(EcPerf)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Taxrevdec  0.005***     
  (5.99)     
Revdec   0.004***     
   (4.19)     
DecGFS1     0.002**   
     (2.35)  
DecGFS2       0.003*** 
       (2.69) 
Coalition -0.068**  -0.015  -0.042*  -0.038 
  (-2.46) (-0.55) (-1.70) (-1.53) 
NSM  -0.008*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.019*** 
  (-2.94) (-8.32) (-7.84) (-7.90) 
EconFreedom  0.104*** 0.146*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 
  (4.90) (8.01) (7.28) (7.38) 
Depend  0.227 0.311 0.191 0.239 
  (0.94) (1.34) (0.86) (1.06) 
TFP 1.802***  0.769 0.447 0.446 
  (2.98) (1.57) (0.02) (0.02) 
Open 0.003**  -0.001  0.001  0.001 
 (1.97)  (-0.75)  (0.78)  (0.33) 
Ethnolig  -0.166  0.373*** 0.561*** 0.511*** 
  (-1.34)  (2.99) (5.23) (4.60) 
Obs  495 398 468 468 
Wald  216.72 363.87 308.51 316.53 
Sigma  0.237 0.193 0.205 0.204 
Note: **,*** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. Country 
dummies are included in all estimated equations   19
 
 
Table 2  
Public sector efficiency and fiscal dependency of local governments 
 PSE(EcPerf)  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
TaxAut 0.001**       
 (2.62)       
TaxAutGFS   0.002***     
   (3.49)     
VertImb1     -0.002***   
     (-2.77)   
VertImb2       -0.003*** 
       (-3.46) 
Coalition -0.088***  -0.039  -0.011  -0.012 
 (-3.55)  (-1.52)  (-0.45)  (-0.45) 
NSM -0.013***  -0.018***  -0.019***  -0.017*** 
 (-5.34)  (-7.67)  (-8.16)  (-6.86) 
EconFreedom 0.119***  0.119***  0.128***  0.115*** 
 (5.91)  (6.05)  (7.10)  (5.96) 
Depend -0.267  -0.045  0.147  0.078 
 (-1.17)  (-0.21)  (0.71)  (0.36) 
TFP 1.441***  1.000**  1.286*** 1.231*** 
 (2.99)  (2.16)  (2.88)  (2.69) 
Open 0.006***  0.001*  0.000  0.001** 
 (3.43)  (1.86)  (-0.15)  (2.41) 
Ethnolig 0.188*  0.361***  0.610***  0.465*** 
 (1.75)  (3.16)  (5.56)  (4.08) 
Obs 581  473  469  469 
Wald 214.60  268.04  331.05  289.10 
Sigma 0.245  0.214  0.203  0.210 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance 
respectively. Country dummies are included in all estimated equations   20 
Table 3 
Sensitivity analysis I: Accounting for outliers, short-run dynamics and regional effects 
PSE(EcPerf)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Taxrevdec  0.005***  0.041***  0.008***  0.005***  0.003***       
  (5.95)  (2.68)  (7.52)  (5.39)  (3.22)       
TaxAut    0.001***    0.001**      0.001**  0.001***  0.001** 
   (2.77)  (2.34)       (2.43)  (3.56)  (2.17) 
Coalition -0.069**  -0.075***  -0.125** -0.107*  -0.029 -0.083***  -0.116*** -0.073** -0.111***  -0.088*** 
  (-2.51) (-3.10) (-2.17) (-1.82) (-0.76) (-2.79) (-3.45)  (-2.27)  (-3.74) (-2.85) 
NSM  -0.008***  -0.011*** -0.011*  -0.007  -0.004  -0.009***  -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.013***  -0.017*** 
  (-2.82) (-4.40) (-1.81) (-1.28) (-1.26) (-3.18) (-4.27)  (-4.75)  (-5.24) (-6.12) 
EconFreedom 0.118***  0.116***  0.071**  0.053*  0.136*** 0.111*** 0.116***  0.144***  0.129*** 0.136*** 
  (5.01) (5.63) (2.21) (1.82) (5.32) (4.96) (4.10)  (6.03)  (5.97) (5.36) 
Depend  0.322  -0.130  0.176  0.398 0.652** 0.099  1.132*** -0.270  -0.428* 0.606* 
  (1.21) (-1.22) (0.43) (0.96) (2.26) (0.39) (3.07)  (-1.05) (-1.69) (1.88) 
TFP 1.722***  1.426**  3.900*  6.199*** 3.134*** 1.969*** 0.732  1.840*** 1.391** 1.050** 
  (2.71) (2.39) (1.79) (3.39) (3.93) (3.03) (1.02)  (3.21)  (2.64) (1.98) 
Open  0.003*  0.005** 0.007**  0.006  0.002  0.003* 0.018*** 0.005*** 0.004***  0.019*** 
  (1.90) (2.48) (2.24) (1.58) (0.95) (1.74) (3.98)  (3.16)  (2.76) (4.88) 
Ethnolig -0.141  0.139  0.329*  0.667***  -0.400***  -0.092  0.166  0.158  0.266**  0.267* 
  (-1.22) (1.40) (1.67) (3.38) (-3.01)  (-0.66) (1.05)  (1.41)  (2.23) (1.82) 
dscand 0.055*  0.101*  0.103*  0.046    0.069**  0.100**    0.116***  0.127*** 
  (1.83) (1.80) (1.93) (0.80)    (2.04) (2.59)    (3.62) (3.59) 
das  0.046  0.048 0.141*  0.121* 0.003  0.030    -0.002  -0.007   
  (1.12) (1.31) (1.82) (1.85) (0.07) (0.73)    (-0.05) (-0.20)   
dmed  0.171*** 0.164*** 0.254*** 0.186*** 0.250***    0.159***  0.229***    0.259*** 
  (3.29) (3.02) (3.92) (2.69) (4.77)    (3.19)  (5.09)    (5.66) 
Obs  446 523 100 117 356 450 352  440  485 436 
Wald  233.72 213.75  82.92  82.18  242.67 220.15 168.97  223.73  219.52 194.93 
Sigma  0.214 0.234 0.192 0.198 0.238 0.240 0.237       
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. Country dummies are included in all estimated equations   21
 
Table 4 
Sensitivity analysis II: Using economic stability as a measure of government performance 
PSE(EcSstab)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Taxrevdec  0.007***         
  (7.26)         
Revdec    0.007***        
    (6.80)        
DecGFS1    0.004***      
     (3.23)       
DecGFS2     0.002**      
      (2.09)      
VertImb1      -0.002**     
       (-2.18)     
VertImb2       -0002**    
        (-2.59)    
TaxAut         0.003***   
         ( 8 . 0 4 )    
TaxAutGFS          0.003***
          ( 2 . 8 7 )  
Coalition  -0.008 0.029 -0.016 -0.015 -0.006 -0.004  -0.044*  -0.012 
  (-0.27) (0.93) (-0.56) (-0.52) (-0.19) (-0.13) (-1.68) (-0.40) 
NSM  0.004  0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (1.49)  (0.18) (-0.37) (-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.40) (0.24) (-0.31) 
EconFreedom  0.147*** 0.155*** 0.153*** 0.149*** 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.102*** 0.144***
  (6.13) (7.13) (6.99) (6.73) (6.26) (6.11) (4.75) (6.44) 
Depend 0.803***  0.728**  0.548**  0.457*  0.296  0.216  -0.099  0.212 
  (2.97) (2.64) (2.10) (1.72) (1.19) (0.84) (-0.41) (0.83) 
TFP  1.532** 1.247** 1.233** 1.206** 1.261** 1.265**  1.567*** 1.135** 
  (2.25) (2.13) (2.35) (2.28) (2.35) (2.29) (3.06) (2.06) 
Open 0.002  0.000  0.004*  0.004*  0.004**  0.005**  0.007***  0.005** 
  (1.10) (0.00) (1.90) (1.71) (2.13) (2.39) (3.73) (2.41) 
Ethnolig  0.031  0.444*** 0.883*** 0.871*** 1.022*** 0.931*** 0.403*** 0.803***
  (0.22) (2.99) (7.00) (6.60) (7.73) (6.91) (3.53) (6.03) 
Obs  495 398 468 468 469 469 581 473
Wald  245.16 287.78 259.97 254.68 258.75 215.93 281.69 212.18
Sigma  0.264 0.233 0.243 0.244 0.244  0.259 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. Country dummies are 
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Appendix A : Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
  Description Obs. Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
min max  Sources 
PSE (EcPerf) 
DEA efficiency scores when 
the output is Economic 
Performance 
630 0.58  0.29 0.28  1 Own calculations based 
on Afonso et al. (2005). 
PSE (EcStab) 
DEA efficiency scores when 
the output is Economic 
Stability 
630 0.61  0.32 0.27  1 Own calculations based 
on Afonso et al. (2005). 
Taxrevdec 
Sub-Central Government own 
tax revenue as a share of 
General Government total tax 
revenue. 
522 22.40 17.09 0.27 61.50  Stegarescu (2005b) 
Revdec 
 Sub-Central Government 
own tax and non-tax revenue 
as a share of General 
Government total tax revenue 
403 25.23 15.89 4.13 64.69  Stegarescu (2005b) 
DecGFS1  Sub-national Expenditures as 
a share of total expenditures 
481 31.70 13.76 1.45 59.18  Government Financial 
Statistics. IMF (2002) 
DecGFS2  Sub-national Revenues as a 
share of total revenues 
481 23.20 14.21 1.61 54.60  Government Financial 
Statistics. IMF (2002) 
TaxAut 
Sub-Central Government own 
tax revenue as a share of  
Sub-Central Government total 
tax revenue 
623 77.27 33.91 2.83  100  Stegarescu (2005b) 
TaxAutGFS 
Sub-national tax revenues as 
a share of sub-national 
revenues and grants 
486 40.59 17.09 2.15  108.73  Government Financial 
Statistics. IMF (2002) 
VertImb1 
Transfers from other levels of 
government as a share of sub-
national expenditures. 
483 40.04 16.61 8.39 82.00  Government Financial 
Statistics. IMF (2002) 
VertImb2 
Transfers from other levels of 
government as a share of sub-
national revenues and grants 
483 41.42 17.70 8.45 86.41  Government Financial 
Statistics. IMF (2002) 
Coalition 
Dummy variable taking the 
value 1 if a coalition cabinet 
is in power 
609 0.55  0.49 0.00 1.00  Tavares (2004) 
NSM  Number of Spending 
Ministers 
633 15.30  4.79 5.00 33.00 Mierau et al. (2007) 
EconFreedom  Index of Economic 
Regulation 
651 5.89  0.81 4.30 8.30  Gwartney and Lawson 
(2006) 
Depend  Population 16- and 65+ as a 
share of total population 





TFP  Total Factor Productivity  630 0
  0.02 -0.20 0.10 
Own Calculations as 
described in Section 
3.3. Data from Penn 
World Tables (2006) 
Open 
Residuals from regression of 
Size on 
(Exports+Imports)/GDP 
630 0 10.77  -43.35  78.83 
Own Calculations as 
described in Section 
3.3. Data from  WBDI 
(2004) 
Ethnolig   Index of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization 
651 0.13  0.11  0.003  0.376  La Porta et al. (1999)   23
 
Appendix B : Graphs of PSE(EcPerf) and PSE(EcStab) 
DEA efficiency scores for EcPerf







































































DEA efficiency scores for EcPerf







































































DEA efficiency scores for EcPerf














































































































































Note: Estimates of PSE(EcPerf)  for Gernany  prior to 1991 and for Japan after 1994 are not available due to the unavailability of 
the data for unemployment and public spending respectively. 
   24
 
DEA  efficiency  scores for EcStab 







































































DEA efficiency scores for EcStab 







































































DEA efficiency scores for EcStab 














































































































































Note: Estimates of PSE(EcStab) for Austria, for Germany prior to 1991 and for Japan after 1994 are not available due to the 
unavailability of the data for standard deviation of growth, inflation and standard deviation of growth and public spending 
respectively. 
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Appendix C : Correlation Matrix 
  DecGFS1 DecGFS2 Taxrevdec Revdec VetrImb VertImb2 TaxAut TaxAut 
GFS  Coalition NSM Depend  Econ 
Freedom  TFP Open  Ethnolig 
DecGFS1  1                        
DecGFS2  0.93  1                     
Taxrevdec  0.71  0.78  1                     
Revdec  0.81 0.87 0.97  1                       
VetrImb  -0.45 -0.70 -0.52  -0.57 1                     
VertImb2  -0.47 -0.73 -0.53  -0.59  0.97  1                   
TaxAut  0.19 0.033 0.45 0.35  0.29 0.29  1                 
TaxAutGFS  0.44 0.66 0.57  0.57  -0.92  -0.86  -0.21  1               
Coalition  -0.02 -0.06 -0.13  -0.08  0.11 0.13  -0.13  -0.07  1             
NSM  -0.14 -0.12 -0.08  -0.16  -0.06  0.01 0.11  0.17  -0.25 1           
Depend  -0.30 -0.35 -0.22  -0.27  0.22 0.27 0.19  -0.27  -0.23  0.09 1         
Econ 
Freedom  0.32  0.26  0.30 0.32  0.09 0.04 0.42  -0.09  -0.21  0.07  -0.07  1       
TFP  -0.02 -0.02 -0.05  -0.04  0.07 0.06  -0.05  -0.05  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  0.04 1     
Open  0.24 0.31 0.20  0.27  -0.18  -0.21  0.045  0.12  -0.16  -0.20  -0.01  0.29  0.02  1   
Ethnolig  0.10 0.20 0.45  0.41  -0.09  -0.07  0.22  0.14  -0.11  -0.04  -0.20  0.19  -0.06  0.063  1   26
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